View Full Version : Best Enemy Money Can Buy
The facts uncovered by A.C Sutton regards the real relationship between east and west , it is an historical account of what has been happening out of sight of the public, from the early 1900's through to the Reagan administration.It is historical data and the question is whether this has continued through to "today"?.....It seems the architechs of the original deception, or the descendants of, feature just as much today when discussing the activities of the financial manipulators, below is part of the Foreward to Suttons book...."The Best Enemy Money Can Buy", and following are excerpts from the same
The invasion of Afghanistan was a landmark shift in Soviet military tactics. Departing from half a century of slow, plodding, "smother the enemy with raw power" tactics, the Soviet military leadership adopted the lightning strike. Overnight, the Soviets had captured the Kabul airfield and had surrounded the capital city with tanks.4
Tanks? In an overnight invasion? How did 30-ton Soviet tanks roll from the Soviet border to the interior city of Kabul in one day? What about the rugged Afghan terrain?
The answer is simple: there are two highways from the Soviet Union to Kabul, including one which is 647 miles long. Their bridges can support tanks. Do you think that Afghan peasants built these roads for yak-drawn carts? Do you think that Afghan peasants built these roads at all? No, you built them.
From this time forward, you can say in confidence to anyone: "The United States financed the economic and military development of the Soviet Union. Without this aid, financed by U.S. taxpayers, there would be no significant Soviet military threat, for there would be no Soviet economy to support the Soviet military machine, let alone sophisticated military equipment." Should your listener scoff, you need only to hand him a copy of this book. it will stuff his mouth with footnotes.
It probably will not change the scoffer's mind, however. Minds are seldom changed with facts, certainly not college-trained minds. Facts did not change Prof. Feinstein's mind, after all. The book will only shut up the scoffer when in your presence. But even that is worth a lot these days.
From this day forward, you should never take seriously any State Department official (and certainly not the Secretary of State) who announces to the press that this nation is now, and has always been, engaged in a worldwide struggle against Communism and Soviet aggression. Once in a while, Secretaries of State feel pressured to give such speeches. They are nonsense. They are puffery for the folks out in middle America.
You may note for future reference my observation that Secretaries of Commerce never feel this pressure to make anti-Communist speeches. They, unlike Secretaries of State, speak directly for American corporate interests. They know where their bread is buttered, and more important, who controls the knife.
When it comes to trading with the enemy, multinational corporate leaders act in terms of the political philosophy of the legendary George Washington Plunkett of Tammany Hall: "I seen my opportunities, and I took 'em." Plunkett was defending "honest graft"; our modern grafters have raised the stakes considerably. They are talking about bi-partisan treason.
Dedicated to the memory of those who died in
Korea and Vietnam victims of our
own technology and greed.
This business of lending blood money is one of the most thoroughly sordid, cold blooded, and criminal that was ever carried on, to any considerable extent, amongst human beings. It is like lending money to slave traders, or to common robbers and pirates, to be repaid out of their plunder. And the man who loans money to governments, so called, for the purpose of enabling the latter to rob, enslave and murder their people, are among the greatest villains that the world has ever seen.
LYSANDER SPOONER, No Treason (Boston, 1870)
To attribute to others the identical sentiments that guide oneself is never to understand others." Gustav Le Bon
Suppression of Information
Information suppression concerning Soviet relations with the United States may be found in all administrations, Democrat and Republican, from President Wilson to President Reagan. For example, on November 28, 1917, just a few weeks after the Petrograd and Moscow Bolsheviks had overthrown the democratic and constitutional government of Russia, "Colonel" House (then in Paris) intervened on behalf of the Bolsheviks and cabled President Wilson and the Secretary of State in the "Special Green" cipher of the State Department as follows:
There has been cabled over and published here [Paris] statements made by American papers to the effect that Russia should be treated as an enemy. It is exceedingly important that such criticisms should be suppressed...6
Suppression of information critical of the Soviet Union and our military assistance to the Soviets may be traced in the State Department files from this 1917 House cable down to the present day, when export licenses issued for admittedly military equipment exports to the USSR are not available for public information. In fact, Soviet sources must be used to trace the impact of some American technology on Soviet military development. The Soviet Register of Shipping, for example, publishes the technical specifications of main engines in Russian vessels (including country of manufacture): this information is not available from U.S. official sources. In November 1971, Krasnaya Zvezda published an article with specific reference to the contribution of the basic Soviet industrial structure to the Soviet military power a contribution that representatives of the U.S. Executive Branch have explicitly denied to the public and to Congress.
For instance, little more than a decade after House's appeal to Wilson, Senator Smoot inquired of the State Department about the possible military end-uses of an aluminum powder plant to be erected in the Soviet Union by W. Hahn, an American engineer. State Department files contain a recently declassified document which states why no reply was ever given to Senator Smoot:
No reply was made to Senator Smoot by the Department as the Secretary did not desire to indicate that the Department had no objection to the rendering by Mr. Hahn of technical assistance to the Soviet authorities in the production of aluminum powder, in view of the possibility of its use as war material, and preferred to take no position at the time in regard to the matter.7
Congress has on the other hand investigated and subsequently published several reports on the export of strategic materials to the Soviet Union. One such instance, called "a life and death matter" by Congress, concerned the proposed shipment of ball bearing machines to the USSR.8 The Bryant Chucking Grinder Company accepted a Soviet order for thirty-five Centalign-B machines for processing miniature ball bearings. All such precision ball bearings in the United States, used by the Department of Defense for missile guidance systems, were processed on seventy-two Bryant Centalign Model-B machines.
In 1961 the Department of Commerce approved export of thirty-five such machines to the USSR, which would have given the Soviets capability about equal to 50 percent of the U.S. capability.
The Soviets had no equipment for such mass production processing, and neither the USSR nor any European manufacturer could manufacture such equipment. A Department of Commerce statement that there were other manufacturers was shown to be inaccurate. Commerce proposed to give the Soviet Union an ability to use its higher-thrust rockets with much greater accuracy and so pull ahead of the United States. Subsequently, a congressional investigation yielded accurate information not otherwise available to independent nongovernment researchers and the general public.
Congressional investigations have also unearthed extraordinary "errors" of judgment by high officials. For example, in 1961 a dispute arose in U.S. government circles over the "Transfermatic Case" a proposal to ship to the USSR two transfer lines (with a total value of $4.3 million) for the production of truck engines.
In a statement dated February 23, 1961, the Department of Defense went on record against shipment of the transfer lines on the grounds that "the technology contained in these Transfermatic machines produced in the United States is the most advanced in the world," and that "so far as this department knows, the USSR has not installed this type of machinery. The receipt of this equipment by the USSR will contribute to the Soviet military and economic warfare potential." This argument was arbitrarily overturned by the incoming Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Secretary McNamara did not allow for the known fact that most Soviet military trucks came from two American-built plants even then receiving equipment from the United States. The Transfermatic machines approved by McNamara had clear and obvious military uses as the Department of Defense had previously argued. Yet McNamara allowed them to go forward.
Yet another calculated deception of the American public can be traced to the Johnson Administration. In 1966 the U.S. Department of State produced a beautiful, extravagantly illustrated brochure of American hand tools. This was printed in Russian, for distribution in Russia, with a preface in Russian by Lyndon Johnson. Requests to the State Department for a copy of this brochure went unanswered. The book is not listed in official catalogues of government publications. It is not available or even known to the general public. No printer's name appears on the back cover. The publisher is not listed. The author obtained a copy from Russia. Here is the preface:
Hand Tools USA9
Welcome to the "Hand Tools USA" exhibit the eighth consecutive exhibit arranged for citizens of the Soviet Union.
At this exhibit you will see samples of various hand tools currently manufactured in the United States tools that facilitate manual work and make it possible to produce better-quality industrial goods at a much lower cost.
Since the very early days of the history of our country, Americans of all ages have worked with hand tools. In industry and at home, in factories and on farms, in workshops and schools, the hand tool has become indispensable in our lives.
Some of these tools have retained their original simplicity of design; others have acquired entirely new forms and are now used to perform new functions.
We sincerely hope that this exhibit will lead to a better understanding of the American people and their way of life.
/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson
Why all the secrecy? Imagine the public reaction in 1966, when the Soviets were supplying the North Viets with weapons to kill Americans (over 5,000 were killed that year), if it had become known that the State Department had published lavish booklets in Russian for free distribution in Russia at taxpayers' expense.
However, the point at issue is not the wisdom of publication, but the wisdom of concealment. The public is not told because the public might protest. In other words, the public cannot be trusted to see things in the same light as the policymakers, and the policymakers are unwilling to defend their positions.
Further, what would have been the domestic political consequences if it had been known that a U.S. President had signed a document in Russian, lavishly produced at the taxpayers' expense for free distribution in Russia, while Russian weapons were killing Americans in Vietnam with assistance from our own deaf mute blindmen? The citizen-taxpayer does not share the expensive illusions of the Washington elite., The political reaction by the taxpayer, and his few supporters in Congress, would have been harsh and very much to the point.
In 1968, for example, the Gleason Company of Rochester, New York shipped equipment to the Gorki automobile plant in Russia, a plant previously built by the Ford Motor Company. The information about shipment did not come from 'the censored licenses but from foreign press sources. Knowledge of license application for any equipment to be used to Gorki would have elicited vigorous protests to Congress. Why? Because the Gorki plant produces a wide range of military vehicles and equipment. Many of the trucks used on the Ho Chi Minh trail were GAZ vehicles from Gorki. The rocket-launchers used against Israel are mounted on GAZ-69 chassis made at Gorki. They have Ford-type engines made at Gorki.
Thus, a screen of censorship vigorously supported by multinational businessmen has withheld knowledge of a secret shift in direction of U.S. foreign policy. This shift can be summarized as follows:
1. Our long-run technical assistance to the Soviet Union has built a first-order military threat to our very existence.
2. Our lengthy history of technical assistance to the Soviet military structure was known to successive administrations, but has only recently (1982) been admitted to Congress or to the American public.
3. Current military assistance is also known, but is admitted only on a case-by-case basis when information to formulate a question can be obtained from nongovernment sources.
4. As a general rule, detailed data on export licenses, which are required to establish the continuing and long-run dependence of the Soviet military-industrial complex on the United States, have been made available to Congress only by special request, and have been denied completely to the American public at large.
In brief, all presidential administrations, from that of Woodrow Wilson to that of Ronald Reagan, have followed a bipartisan foreign policy of building up the Soviet Union. This policy is censored. It is a policy of suicide.
Persistent pressure from nongovernmental researchers and knowledgeable individuals has today forced the Administration to at least publicly acknowledge the nature of the problem but still do very little about it. For instance, in an interview on March 8, 1982, William Casey, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, made the following revealing statement:
We have determined that the Soviet strategic advances depend on Western technology to a far greater degree than anybody ever dreamed of. It just doesn't make any sense for us to spend additional billions of dollars to protect ourselves against the capabilities that the Soviets have developed largely by virtue of having pretty much of a free ride on our research and development.
They use every method you can imagine purchase, legal and illegal; theft; bribery; espionage; scientific exchange; study of trade press, and invoking the Freedom of Information Act to get this information.
We found that scientific exchange is a big hole. We send scholars or young people to the Soviet Union to study Pushkin poetry; they send a 45-year-old man out of their KGB or defense establishment to exactly the schools and the professors who are working on sensitive technologies.
The KGB has developed a large, independent, specialized organization which does nothing but work on getting access to Western science and technology. They have been recruiting about 100 young scientists and engineers a year for the last 15 years. They roam the world looking for technology to pick up.
Back in Moscow there are 400 or 500 assessing what they might need and where they might get it doing their targeting and then assessing what they get. It's a very sophisticated and farflung operation.10
Unfortunately, Mr. Casey, who pleads surprise at the discovery, is still concealing the whole story. This author (not alone) made this known to Department of Defense over 15 years ago, with a request for information to develop the full nature of the problem. This exchange of letters is reproduced as Appendix A. Nothing was done in 1971. In the past 15 years there has been a superficial change the Reagan Administration is now willing to admit the existence of the problem. It has not yet been willing to face the policy challenge. Until the deaf mute blindmen are neutralized, our assistance for Soviet strategic advances will continue.
American Trucks in Korea and Vietnam
For the Other Side
If we do not develop our automobile industry, we are threatened with the heaviest losses, if not defeats, in a future war. Pravda, July 20, 1927
At the end of World War II the U.S. government appointed an interagency committee to consider the future of the German automobile industry and its war-making potential. This committee concluded that any motor vehicle industry in any country is an important factor in that country's war potential.
More than half U.S. tanks, almost all armored and half-track vehicles and one-third of guns over 33 millimeter were manufactured in U.S. civilian motor vehicle plants.
Consequently, the committee unanimously recommended:
1. Any vehicle industry is a major force for war.
2. German automotive manufacturing should be prohibited because it was a war industry.
3. Numerous military products can be made by the automobile industry, including aerial torpedoes, aircraft cannon, aircraft instruments, aircraft engines, aircraft engines parts, aircraft ignition testers, aircraft machine guns, aircraft propeller subassemblies, aircraft propellers, aircraft servicing and testing equipment, aircraft struts, airframes, and so on. A total of 300 items of military equipment was listed.
A comparison of the recommendations from this committee with subsequent administrative recommendations and policies for the export of automobile-manufacturing plants to the Soviet Union demonstrates extraordinary inconsistencies. If automobile-manufacturing capacity has "warlike" potential for Germany and the United States, then it also has "warlike" potential for the Soviet Union. But the recommendations for post-war Germany and the Soviet Union are totally divergent. Some of the same Washington bureaucrats (for example, Charles R. Weaver of the Department of Commerce) participated in making both decisions.
The Soviet Military Truck Industry
Soviet civilian and military trucks are produced in the same plants and have extensive interchangeability of parts and components. For example, the ZIL-131 was the main 31/2-ton 6x6 Soviet military truck used in Vietnam and Afghanistan and is produced also in a civilian 4 x 2 version as the ZIL-130. Over 60 percent of the parts in the ZIL-131 military truck are common to the ZIL-130 civilian truck.
All Soviet truck technology and a large part of Soviet truck-manufacturing equipment has come from the West, mainly from the United States. While some elementary transfers-lines and individual machines for vehicle production are made in the Soviet Union, these are copies of Western machines and always obsolete in design.
Many major American companies have been prominent in building up the Soviet truck industry. The Ford Motor Company, the A. J. Brandt Company, the Austin Company, General Electric, Swindell-Dressier, and others supplied the technical assistance, design work, and equipment of the original giant plants.
The Ford Gorki "Automobile" Plant
In May 1929 the Soviets signed an agreement with the Ford Motor Company of Detroit. The Soviets agreed to purchase $13 million worth of automobiles and parts and Ford agreed to give technical assistance until 1938 to construct an integrated automobile-manufacturing plant at Nizhni-Novgorod. Construction was completed in 1933 by the Austin Company for production of the Ford Model-A passenger car and light truck. Today this plant is known as Gorki. With its original equipment supplemented by imports and domestic copies of imported equipment, Gorki produces the GAZ range of automobiles, trucks, and military vehicles. All Soviet vehicles with the model prefix GAZ (Gorki Avtomobilnyi Zavod) are from Gorki, and models with prefixes UAX, OdAZ, and PAZ are made from Gorki components.
In 1930 Gorki produced the Ford Model-A (known as GAZ-A) and the Ford light truck (called GAZ-AA). Both these Ford models were immediately adopted for military use. By the late 1930s production at Gorki was 80,000-90,000 "Russian Ford" vehicles per year.
The engine production facilities at Gorki were designed under a technical assistance agreement with the Brown Lipe Gear Company for gear-cutting technology and Timken-Detroit Axle Company for rear and front axles.
Furthermore, U.S. equipment has been shipped in substantial quantifies to Gorki and subsidiary plants since the 1930s indeed some shipments were made from the United States in 1968 during the Vietnamese War.
As soon as Ford's engineers left Gorki in 1930 the Soviets began production of military vehicles. The Soviet BA armored car of the 1930s was the GAZ-A (Ford Model-A) chassis, intended for passenger cars, but converted to an armored car with the addition of a DT machine gun. The BA was followed by the BA-10 the Ford Model-A truck chassis with a mount containing either a 37-millimeter gun or a 12.7-millimeter heavy machine gun. A Red Army staff car was also based on the Ford Model-A in the pre-war period.
In brief, the Gorki plant, built by the Ford Motor Company the Austin Company and modernized by numerous other U.S. companies under the policy of "peaceful trade," is today a major producer of Soviet army vehicles and weapons carriers.
The A. J. Brandt-ZIL Plant
A technical assistance agreement was concluded in 1929 with the Arthur J. Brandt Company of Detroit for the reorganization and expansion of the tsarist AMO truck plant, previously equipped in 1917 with new U.S. equipment. Design work for this expansion was handled in Brandt's Detroit office and plant and American engineers were sent to Russia.
The AMO plant was again expanded in 1936 by the Budd Company and Hamilton Foundry and its name was changed to ZIS (now ZIL). During World War II the original equipment was removed to establish the URALS plant and the ZIS plant was re-established with Lend-Lease equipment.
Thus the ZIL plant, originally designed and rebuilt under the supervision of the A. J. Brandt Company of Detroit in 1930 and equipped by other American companies, was again expanded by Budd and Hamilton Foundry in 19;36. Rebuilt with Lend-Lease equipment and periodically updated with late model imports, ZIL has had a long and continuous history of producing Soviet military cargo trucks and weapons carriers.
On April 19, 1972, the U.S. Navy photographed a Russian freighter bound for Haiphong with a full load of military cargo, including a deck load of ZIL-130 cargo trucks and ZIL-555 dump trucks (Human Events, May 13, 1972). Thus the "peaceful trade" of the 1930s, the 1940s, the 1950s, 1960s and the 1970s was used to kill Americans in Vietnam, and commit genocide in Afghanistan.
The original 1930 equipment was removed from ZIL in 1944 and used to build the Miass plant. It was replaced by Lend-Lease equipment, was supplemented by equipment imports in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s.
The Urals plant at Miass (known as Urals ZIS or ZIL) was built in 1944 and largely tooled with equipment evacauted form the Moscow ZIL plant. The Urals Miass plant started production with the Urals-5 light truck, utilizing an engine with the specifications of the 1920 Fordson (original Ford Motor Company equipment supplied in the late 1920s was used, supplemented by Lend-Lease equipment). The Urals plant today produces weapons models: for example, a prime mover for guns, including the long-range 130-millimeter cannon, and two versions tracked and wheeled of a 12-ton prime mover.
Possibly there may have been doubt as to Soviet end-use of truck plants back in the 20s and ;30s, but the above information certainly was known to Washington at least by the mid 1960s when this author's first volume was published. The next chapter presents official Washington's suicidal reaction to this information, under pressure from the deaf mute blindmen.
The Deaf Mutes Supply Trucks for Afghan Genocide
"The (American) businessmen who built the Soviet Kama River truck plant should be shot as traitors." Avraham Shifrin, former Soviet Defense Ministry official
Although the military output from Gorki and ZIL was well known to U.S. intelligence and therefore to successive administrations, American aid for construction of even large military truck plants was approved in the 1960s and 1970s.
Under intense political pressure from the deaf mute blindmen, U.S. politicians, particularly in the Johnson and Nixon administrations under the prodding of Henry Kissinger (a long-time employee of the Rockefeller family), allowed the Togliatti (Volgograd) and Kama River plants to be built.
The Volgograd automobile plant, built between 1968 and 1971, has a capacity of 600,000 vehicles per year, three times more than the Ford-built Gorki plant, which up to 1968 had been the largest auto plant in the USSR.
Although Volgograd is described in Western literature as the "Togliatti plant" or the "Fiat-Soviet auto plant," and does indeed produce a version of the Fiat-124 sedan, the core of the technology is American. Three-quarters of the equipment, including the key transfer lines and automatics, came from the United States. It is truly extraordinary that a plant with known military potential could have been equipped from the United States in the middle of the Vietnamese War, a war in which the North Vietnamese received 80 percent of their supplies from the Soviet Union.
The construction contract, awarded to Fiat S.p.A., a firm closely associated with Chase Manhattan Bank, included an engineering fee of $65 million. The agreement between Fiat and the Soviet government included:
The supply of drawing and engineering data for two automobile models, substantially similar to the Fiat types of current production, but with the modifications required by the particular climatic and road conditions of the country; the supply of a complete manufacturing plant project, with the definition of the machine tools, toolings, control apparatus, etc.; the supply of the necessary know-how, personnel training, plant start-up assistance, and other similar services.
All key machine tools and transfer lines came from the United States. While the tooling and fixtures were designed by Fiat, over $50 million worth of the key special equipment came from U.S. suppliers. This included:
1. Foundry machines and heat-treating equipment, mainly flask and core molding machines to produce cast iron and aluminum parts and continuous heat-treating furnaces.
2. Transfer lines for engine parts, including four lines for pistons, lathes, and grinding machines for engine crank-shafts, and boring and honing machines for cylinder linings and shaft housings.
3. Transfer lines and machines for other components, including transfer lines for machining of differential carriers and housing, automatic lathes, machine tools for production of gears, transmission sliding sleeves, splined shafts, and hubs.
4. Machines for body parts, including body panel presses, sheet straighteners, parts for painting installations, and upholstery processing equipment.
5. Materials-handling, maintenance, and inspection equipment consisting of overhead twin-rail Webb-type conveyors, assembly and storage lines, special tool 'sharpeners for automatic machines, and inspection devices.
Some equipment was on the U.S. Export Control and Co-Corn lists as strategic, but this proved no setback to the Johnson Administration: the restrictions were arbitrarily abandoned. Leading U.S. machine-tool firms participated in supplying the equipment: TRW, Inc. of Cleveland supplied steering linkages; U.S. Industries, Inc. supplied a "major portion" of the presses; Gleason Works of Rochester, New York (well known as a Gorki supplier) supplied gear-cutting and heat-treating equipment; New Britain Machine Company supplied automatic lathes. Other equipment was supplied by U.S. subsidiary companies in Europe and some came directly from European firms (for example, Hawker-Siddeley Dynamics of the United Kingdom supplied six industrial robots). In all, approximately 75 percent of the production equipment came from the United States and some 25 percent from Italy and other countries in Europe, including U.S. subsidiary companies.
In 1930, when Henry Ford undertook to build the Gorki plant, contemporary Western press releases extolled the peaceful nature of the Ford automobile, even though Pravda had openly stated that the Ford automobile was wanted for military purposes. Notwithstanding naive Western press releases, Gorki military vehicles were later used to help kill Americans in Korea and Vietnam.
The War Potential of the Kama Truck Plant
Up to 1968 American construction of Soviet military truck plants was presented as "peaceful trade." In the late 1960s Soviet planners decided to build the largest truck factory in the world. This plant, spread over 36 square miles situated on the Kama River, has an annual output of 100,000 multi-axle 10-ton trucks, trailers, and off-the-road vehicles. It was evident from the outset, given absence of Soviet technology in the automotive industry, that the design, engineering work, and key equipment for such a facility would have to come from the United States.
In 1972, under President Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, the pretense of "peaceful trade" was abandoned and the Department of Commerce admitted (Human Events, Dec. 1971) that the proposed Kama plant had military potential. Not only that, but according to a department spokesman, the military capability was taken into account when the export licenses were issued for Kama.
The following American firms received major contracts to supply production equipment for the gigantic Kama heavy truck plant:
Glidden Machine & Tool, Inc., North Tonawanda, New York Milling machines and other machine tools.
Gulf and Western Industries, Inc., New York, N.Y. A contract for $20 million of equipment.
Holcroft & Co., Kovinia, Michigan Several contracts for heat treatment furnaces for metal parts.
Honeywell, Inc., Minneaspolis, Minnesota Installation of automated production lines and production control equipment.
Landis Manufacturing Co., Ferndale, Michigan Production equipment for crankshafts and other machine tools.
National Engineering Company, Chicago Illinois Equipment for the manufacutre of castings.
Swindell-Dresser Company (a subsidy of Pullman Incorporated), Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Design of a foundry and equipment for the foundry, including heat treatment furnaces and sine;ting equipment under several contracts ($14 million).
Warner & Swazey Co., Cleveland, Ohio Production equipment for crankshafts and other machine tools.
Combustion Engineering: molding machines ($30 million). Ingersoll Milling Machine Company: milling machines.
E. W. Bliss Company
Who were the government officials responsible for this transfer of known military technology? The concept originally came from National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, who reportedly sold President Nixon on the idea that giving military technology to the Soviets would temper their global territorial ambitions. How Henry arrived at this gigantic non sequitur is not known. Sufficient to state that he aroused considerable concern over his motivations. Not least that Henry had been a paid family employee of the Rockefellers since 1958 and has served as International Advisory Committee Chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, a Rockefeller concern.
The U.S.-Soviet trade accords including Kama and other projects were signed by George Pratt Shultz, later to become Secretary of State in the Reagan Administration and long known as a proponent of more aid and trade to the Soviets. Shultz is former President of Bechtel Corporation, a multi-national contractor and engineering firm.
American taxpayers underwrote Kama financing through the Export-Import Bank. The head of Export-Import Bank at that time was William J. Casey, a former associate of Armand Hammer and now (1985) Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Financing was arranged by Chase Manhattan Bank, whose then Chairman was David Rockefeller. Chase is the former employer of Paul Volcker, now Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank. Today, William Casey denies knowledge of the military applications (see page 195), although this was emphatically pointed out to official Washington 15 years ago.
We cite these names to demonstrate the tight interlocking hold proponents of miltiary aid to the Soviet Union maintain on top policy making government positions.
On the other hand, critics of selling U.S. military technology have been ruthlessly silenced and suppressed.
Critics of Kama Silenced and Suppressed
For two decades rumors have surfaced that critics of aid to the Soviet Union have been silenced. Back in the 1930s General Electric warned its employees in the Soviet Union not to discuss their work in the USSR under penalty of dismissal.
In the 1950s and 1960s IBM fired engineers who publicly opposed sale of IBM computers to the USSR.
Let's detail two cases for the record; obviously this topic requires Congressional investigation. At some point the American public needs to know who has suppressed this information, and to give these peri sons an opportunity to defend their actions in public.
The most publicized case is that of Lawrence J. Brady, now Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Trade Administration. Ten years ago Brady was a strong critic of exporting the Kama River truck technology. In his own words (in 1982 before a Senate Investigating Committee) is Brady's view on Kama River.
However, Mr. Brady was unaware of a similar and much earlier story of suppression in the Kama case which paralleled his own.
In the years 1960-1974 this writer authored a three volume series, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, published between 1968 and 197:3 by the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, where the author was Research Fellow. This series cataloged the origins of Soviet technology from 1917 down to the early 1970s. The series excluded the military aspects of technical transfers. However, the work totally contradicted U.S. Government public statements. For example, in 1963 State Department claimed in its public pronouncements that all Soviet technology was indigenous, a clear misunderstanding or dismissal of the facts.
By the early 1970s it was clear to this author that a significant part of Soviet military capability also came from the West, even though this assessment was also refuted by U.S. government analysts. Quietly, without government or private funding, this author researched and wrote National Suicide: Military Aid to the Soviet Union. The manuscript was accepted by Arlington House. Both author and publisher maintained absolute silence about the existence of the manuscript until publication date.
When news of publication reached Stanford, there was immediate reaction a hostile reaction. A series of meetings was called by Hoover
Institution Director W. Glenn Campbell. Campbell's objectives were:
1) to withdraw the book from publication,
2) failing that, to disassociate Hoover Institution from the book and the author.
Campbell initially claimed that National Suicide was a plagiarism of the author's works published by Hoover. This was shown to be nonsense. In any event an author can hardly plagiarize himself. The objective, of course, was to persuade author and publisher to withhold publication. Both the author and Arlington House refused to withdraw the book and continued with publication. The book was published and sold over 50,000 copies.
After the unsuccessful attempt at suppression Glenn Campbell arbitrarily removed the title Research Fellow from the author and removed both his name and that of his secretary from the personnel roll of the Hoover Institution. This effectively disassociated Hoover Institution from the book and its contents. The author became a non-person. Two years later the author voluntarily left Hoover Institution and assumed a private role unconnected with any research foundation or organization. These events happened some years before Mr. Brady of Commerce took his own personal stand and suffered a similar fate.
By a strange quirk of fate, Glenn Campbell is today Chairman of Mr. Reagan's Intelligence Oversight Committee.
Who were the Deaf Mute Blindmen at Kama River?
Clearly, the Nixon Administration at the highest levels produced more than a normal number of deaf mutes those officials who knew the story of our assistance to the Soviets but for their own reasons were willing to push forward a policy that could only work to the long run advantage of the United States. It is paradoxical that an Administration that was noisy in its public anti-communist stance, and quick to point out the human cost of the Soviet system, was also an Administration that gave a gigantic boost to Soviet military truck capacity.
Possibly campaign contributions had something to do with it. Multina-tionals listed below as prime contractors on Kama River were also major political contributors. However, the significant link never explored by Congress is that Henry Kissinger, the key promoter of the Kama River truck plant at the policy level, was a former and long-time employee of the Rockefeller family and the Rockefellers are the largest single shareholders in Chase Manhattan Bank (David was then Chairman of the Board) and Chase was the lead financier for Kama River. This is more than the much criticised "revolving door." It is close to an arm's length relationship, i.e., the use of public policy for private ends.
Here are the corporations with major contracts at Kama River, listed with the name and address of the Chairman of the Board in 1972.
GULF & WESTERN INDUSTRIES, INC.
1 Gulf and Western Plaza, New York NY 10023
Tel. (212) 333-7000
Chairman of the Board: Charles G. Bluhdorn
Note: Charles Bluhdorn is also a Trustee of Freedoms Foundations
at Valley Forge and Chairman of Paramount Pictures Corp.
E. W. BLISS CO. (a subsidiary of Gulf & Western)
217 Second Street NW, Canton, Ohio 44702
Tel. (216) 453-7701
Chairman of the Board: Carl E. Anderson
Note: Carl E. Anderson is also Chairman of the American-Israel
Chamber of Commerce & Industry
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC.
277 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Tel. (212) 826-7100
Chairman of the Board: Arthur J. Santry, Jr.
HOLCROFT AND COMPANY
12062 Market Street, Livonia, Mich. 48150
Tel. (313) 261-8410
Chairman of the Board: John A. McMann
HONEYWELL, INC.
2701 4th Avenue S., Minneapolis, Minn. 55408
Tel. (612) 332-5200
Chairman of the Board: James H. Binger
INGERSOLL MILLING MACHINE COMPANY
707 Fulton Street, Rockford, ILL 61101
Tel. (815) 963-6461
Chairman of the Board: Robert M. Gaylord
NATIONAL ENGINEERING CO.
20 N. Wacker Drive, Chicago, ILL 60606
Tel. (312) 782-6140
Chairman of the Board: Bruce L. Simpson
PULLMAN, INC.
200 S. Michigan Ave., Chicago, ILL 60604
Tel. (312) 939-4262
Chairman of the Board: W. Irving Osborne, Jr.
SWINDELL-DRESSLER CO. (Division of Pullman, Inc.)
441 Smithfield Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Tel. (412) 391-4800
Chairman of the Board: Donald J. Morfee
WARNER & SWAZEY
11000 Cedar Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio 44106
Tel. (216) 431-6014
Chairman of the Board: James C. Hodge
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK
Chairman of the Board: David Rockefeller
Soviets Buy into the 21st Century
Back in 1929 Pravda commented that without the automobile the Soviet Army would be helpless in any future war. Western multinationals Ford Motor Company, Hercules Gear, IBM and others helped USSR bridge the gap of the 1920s. Identical aid can be found for electronics.
In August 1971 the U.S. Department of Defense paid $2 million to Hamilton Watch Company for precision watchmaking equipment. Watchmaking equipment is used in fabricating bomb and artillery shell fuses, aircraft timing gear, pinions, and similar military components. Most Soviet watch-manufacturing equipment has been supplied from the United States and Switzerland; in some cases the Soviets use copies of these foreign machines.
In 1929 the old Miemza concession factory, formerly a tsarist plant, received the complete equipment of the Ansonia Clock Company of New York, purchased for $500,000. This became the Second State Watch Factory in Moscow, brought into production by American and German engineers, and adapted to military products.
In 1920 the complete Deuber-Hampton Company plant at Canton, Ohio, was transferred to the Soviet Union, and brought into production by forty American technicians. Up to 1930 all watch components used in the Soviet Union had been imported from the United States and Switzerland. This new U.S.-origin manufacturing capability made possible the production of fuses and precision gears for military purposes; during World War II it was supplemented by Lend-Lease supplies and machinery.
After World War II Soviet advances in military instrumentation were based on U.S. and British devices, although the German contribution was heavy in the 1950s. About 65 percent of the production facilities removed from Germany were for the manufacture of power and lighting equipment, telephone, telegraph, and communications equipment, and cable and wire. The remainder consisted of German plants to manufacture radio tubes and radios, and military electronics facilities for such items as secret teleprinters and anti-aircraft equipment.
Many German wartime military electronic developments were made at the Reichpost Forschungsinstitut (whose director later went to the USSR) and these developments were absorbed by the Soviets, including television, infrared devices, radar, electrical coatings, acoustical fuses, and similar equipment. But although 80 percent of the German electrical and military electronics industries were removed, the Soviets did not acquire modern computer, control instrumentation, or electronic technologies from Germany: these they acquired from the U.S.
Taking semi-conductors as an example, three stages can be identified in the transfer process. The Soviets were able to import or manufacture small laboratory quantities of semi-conductors from an early date. What they could not do, as in many other technologies, was mass produce components with high quality characteristics. This situation is described by Dr. Lara Baker, a Soviet computer expert, before Congress:
The Soviet system in preproduction can manage to produce a few of almost any product they want, provided they are willing to devote the resources to it. The best example of this would be the Soviet 'civilian' space program, in which they managed to put people in orbit before the United States did, but at a high cost.
In the area of serial production, that is, the day to day production of large quantities of a product, the differences between the two systems become most obvious. Serial production is the Achilles heel of the Soviet bloc. Especially in high technology areas, the big problem the Soviets have is quality assurance they count products, not quality products. This is the area where the Soviets exhibit weakness and need the most help.14
The first phase for the Soviets was to Identify the technology needed, in this case a semi-conductor plant, to bridge the chasm between the 19th century and the 21st century.
The second phase was to obtain the equipment to establish a manufacturing plant.
The third phase was to bring this plant into production and make the best use of its output in an economy where developmental engineering resources do not exist in depth and military objectives have absolute priority.
We shall demonstrate in Chapter Five how the Soviets achieved the first of these tasks with the help of the Control Data Corporation, Mr. William Norris, Chairman. The second phase was achieved through an illegal espionage network, the Bruchhausen network. The third phase is today in progress, although the phases one and two are already in place in the Soviet military complex.
The emphasis in this critical transfer of semi-conductor technology was not reverse engineering as, for example, the Soviet Agatha computer is reverse engineered from the Apple II computer, but use of U.S. manufacturing techniques and equipment to bridge a gigantic gap in Soviet engineering capabilities. The Soviet system does not generate the wealth of technology common in the West. It cannot choose the most efficient among numerous methods of achieving a technical objective because the Marxist system lacks the abundant fruits of an enterprise system. The emphasis in semi-conductors is transfer of a complete manufacturing technology to produce high quality products for known military end uses WHICH COULD NOT HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED BY THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES, WITHOUT FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN THEIR SYSTEM.
How the Deaf Mute Blindmen Helped the Soviets into the 21st Century
With these insights into Soviet technological acquisition strategy we can identify the stages by which the Soviets acquired semi-conductor technology. Chronologically these are:
DATE EVENT
1951 Semi-conductor developed in Santa Clara Valley, California. From this point on Soviets import chips and then manufacture on a laboratory scale.
1971 "Computer in a chip" development. Soviets still unable to mass produce even primitive semi-conductor devices.
1973 Control Data Corporation (CDC) agrees to supply Soviets with a wide range of scientific and engineering information including construction and design of a large fast computer (75 to 100 million instructions per second is fast even in 1985) and manufacturing techniques for semi-conductors and associated technologies (See Chapter Five).
1977-80 Soviets acquire technology for a semi-conductor plant through the Bruchhausen network and Continental Trading Corp. (CTC). The CDC agreement gives Soviets sufficient information to set up a purchasing and espionage program. CDC told the Soviets what they needed to buy.
1981-82 Commerce Department lax in enforcing export control regulations. U.S. Customs Service makes determined efforts to stop export of semi-conductor manufacturing equipment.
1985 Soviets establish plant for semi-conductor mass production. Soviet military equipment based on this new output.
1986 U.S. taxpayer continues to support a defense budget of over $300 billion a year. Without these transfers Soviet military could not have been computerised and U.S. defense budget reduced.
The Bruchausen spy / smuggling network is interesting also, believe it not I spent a long time culling these posts down, the whole deal is here....http://reformed-theology.org/html/books/best_enemy/index.html
The Type of Equipment Shipped to the USSR
The Bruchhausen network was extremely efficient at obtaining the type of equipment needed by the Soviets for their semiconductor plant.
Here is a summary as reported to a Congressional Committee by an American computer expert.
Senator Nunn: Were you familiar with the nature of the equipment that was being shipped for the Soviets?
Mr. Marshall: Yes, I was.
Senator Nunn: What was it to have been used for in your opinion?
Mr. Marshall: It would have been used for the production of the integrated circuits. It was part of the photolithography process used to make integrated circuits.
Senator Nunn: What about the military applications?
Mr. Marshall: The circuits certainly have military application; the equipment has no military application.
Senator Nunn: This is primarily industrial?
Mr. Marshall: For production circuits used to print the patterns, the microscopic patterns on the silicon
Senator Nunn: Does that mean once they produce these they would have been using it for commercial purposes?
Mr. Marshall: Commercial or military.
Senator Nunn: Or military?
Mr. Marshall: Yes.
Senator Nunn: Members of the minority staff showed you a list of equipment that has been illegally exported to the Soviets over the period 1976 to 1980; is that correct?
Mr. Marshall: Yes.
Senator Nunn: These illegal exports were valued at about $10 million. Have you looked at that list?
Mr. Marshall: I have seen the list, yes.
Senator Nunn: What type of equipment was this and how would it have been used. in your opinion?
Mr. Marshall: Most of the equipment there really broke down into two categories. One category was mainly test equipment, for testing integrated circuits. Another area was software development.
Examination of Continental Technology Corporation invoices demonstrates the high technology specialized nature of the equipment shipped by the Bruchhausen network. Here are sample summaries based on CTC invoices:
So confident are the Soviets that our strategic goods embargo is a leaky sieve that they not only import illegal military end use equipment, but ship it back to the West for repair, presumably secure in the belief that it can be reimported.
One example that was intercepted occurred in July 1977 when California Technology Corporation placed a purchase order with a U.S. manufacturer for $66,000 in components for sophisticated electronic machinery with direct military application. All components ordered were Munitions List items and cannot be legally exported without approval from the U.S. Department of State. Yet CTC received the equipment and in September 1977, under the name Interroga International Components and Sales Organization, CTC exported the components to West Germany.
Three years later one of the components was in need of repair. It was sent to the manfuacturer's plant for work. On June 16 and 23, 1981, in West Germany, Stephen Dodge of Customs, Robert Rice of Commerce, and Theodore W. Wu, Assistant U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles, received information that the machinery had been sold originally to Mashpriborintorg of Moscow, and the Russians had sent the disabled component back to ADT of Dusseldorf for repair.
A telex from CTC executives in Dusseldorf to Anatoli Maluta in Los Angeles, dated February 27, 1980, was seized by U.S. Customs agents. The telex said the component would be returned to the U.S. for repair. A "friend" would receive the repaired equipment and then turn it over to Maluta for re-export.
Now let's turn to the question of how the Soviets know what to order for their semiconductor plant. The invoices reproduced above suggest the Soviets knew precisely what production equipment they wanted to build a semiconductor plant. The question is how did they find out the model numbers, specifications and the rest?
MrPenny
07-13-2009, 08:14 PM
tl;dr
How 'bout just a link that we can read.....and more content provided by you, KIWI, that gives us some idea of what you think?
I happen to think 'cut-n-paste' posts are cheap and tawdry.
Cool.....I've been looking for a chance to use "tawdry".....
Computers - Deception by Control Data Corporation
"We have offered to the Socialist countries only standard commercial computers and these offerings have been in full compliance with the export control and administrative directives of the Department of Commerce." William C. Norris, Chairman Control Data Corporation
William Norris, Chairman of Control Data, has a lively correspondence with Americans anxious to learn his rationale for supporting the Soviet Union.
We quote below an extract from a letter written by William Norris to an inquirer:
You also made reference [wrote Norris] in your letter to Russia's first democratic government that was overthrown by the communists. You are incorrect on this point. There never has been any democracy in Russia as a matter of fact, the Russian standard of living today is higher than it was under the tsars. Further, you don't find a great deal of unhappiness in the Soviet Union over living conditions and the communist regime for two reasons (1) they have never know [sic] what democracy is, and (2) life is better than it used to be.
Here are the errors in the above Norris paragraph:
"There has never been any democracy in Russia."
Incorrect. The Kerensky government from March to November, 1917 was freely elected and overthrown by the Bolsheviks (with the aid of Western businessmen such as William Norris).
"You don't find a great deal of unhappiness in the Soviet Union over living conditions."
Incorrect. Mr. Norris should look out the window of his Moscow office at the uniform drab blocks of apartments. How many families live in one room? How often do several families live in one apartment? How about the hours spent in food lines, and the limited choice of consumer goods in a guns-before-butter economy? Just how many individual Russians has Mr. Norris freely spoken with? Not those of the "nomenklatura," but average Russians in the street. We venture to guess none at all.
"... standard of living today is higher than under the tsars."
Take one item wheat. In 1906 Russia was the world's largest wheat exporter and the world's largest wheat producer. The climate is the same today as in 1906, yet is used as a forlorn excuse for Soviet pitiful wheat production. In fact, 80% of Russian bread today is made from imported wheat, the home-grown is only fit for cattle feed. Without Western wheat, Russia today would starve. Is that a truly higher standard of living? Anyway, Russians today don't compare their standards to those of tsarist times but to the Western world.
William Norris only sees what he wants to see, hears what he wants to hear, and presumably speaks from these limited impressions of the world.
In conclusion, we can thank Mr. Norris and Control Data Corporation that Soviet military has been able to break into the electronics based warfare of the late 20th and early 21st century.
CDC fulfilled phase one of the Soviet program for acquisition of Western semiconductor technology and mass production facilities.
tl;dr
How 'bout just a link that we can read.....and more content provided by you, KIWI, that gives us some idea of what you think?
I happen to think 'cut-n-paste' posts are cheap and tawdry.
Cool.....I've been looking for a chance to use "tawdry".....
ah , mr Penny, long time no moan
I guess its a personel thing, there is a link above , and I intend to give plenty of input should the thread create a bit of debate, by cut and paste its at least assured that if there is a following discussion, ther is no confusion as to the points being looked at,
and I happen to think "post-a-link" posts are cheap and lazy, I donate to the site $$, so dont feel guilty about large posts, if that may be onje of your concerns
the post "box" is fucked from my end and I cant seperate the tx as I would like, making it easier on the eye,
I will add, I see all the info posted as fact, the content IMO isnt what needs questionig as far as its authenticity, I part company with the author as to the outcome , as I said earlier this is all historic, a lot has changed since these events took place, the emphesis is off the Russians, the "bad-guys" now wear turbans, there is still the communist element as regards North Korea, but today although the focus has shifted, it is all the same game for the elite......the industrialist bankers
The Deaf Mutes and the Soviet Missile Threat
"As for businessmen, I could persuade a capitalist on Friday to bankroll a revolution on Saturday that will bring him a profit on Sunday even though he will be executed on Monday."
Saul Alinsky, Chicago professional activist
In October 1965, "Isakov began to push for delivery on the ac-celerorneter. [Epstein] surmised that the urgency had something to do with the fact that the Soviets had smashed three vehicles onto the surface of the moon." Although Epstein was able to stall for "quite some time" on various grounds, Isakov later became "quite anxious to obtain an accelerometer." When Epstein pleaded export problems, Isakov suggested he would use the Soviet diplomatic pouch.
Eighteen months later, in August 1967, another Russian, intensively interested in accelerometers, turned up in the United States, this time under the auspices of the State Department Academic Exchange Program. From August 1967 to June 1968, Anatoliy K. Kochev of the Kalinin Polytechnical Institute of Leningrad was at Catholic University in the United States working on "construction methods of equipment to measure small accelerations and displacement," that is, the manufacture of accelerorneters.
Is there any connection between Isakov's unsuccessful espionage attempts to purchase accelerometers and Kochev's "academic" work on accelerometer manufacture in the United States, courtesy of the State Department? There are indeed obsolete accelerometers and sophisticated accelerometers. The Soviets know the difference. They know how to make the obsolete versions, but do not have the technical ability to make more sophisticated instruments. The trick is in the manufacturing process that is, in knowing how to build into the instrument the sensitivity necessary to measure small gravitational pulls quickly and accurately. It is the manufacturing technique that was important to the Soviets much more important than a boatful of purchased accelerometers.
Why did Kochev come to the United States in 19677 The State Department reports the title of his project as "construction methods of equipment to measure small accelerations." Ten months would be sufficient time for a competent engineer to determine the most modern methods in this field, and given the rather careless manner in which advanced accelerometers have found their way into used electronic equipment stores, it is unlikely that Kochev had major problems in adding to his knowledge of the state of the art.
Why did the State Department make an agreement in 1966 to allow a Soviet engineer into the United States to study the manufacture of accelerometers only a few months after another Soviet national had been foiled by the FBI in attempting to purchase an accelerometer? We have no answer for that.
One firm in particular, the Bryant Chucking Grinder Company of Springfield, Vermont, has been an outstanding supplier of ball bearing processing equipment to the Soviets. In 1931 Bryant shipped 32.2 percent of its output to the USSR. In 1934, 55.3 percent of its output went to Russia. There were no luther shipments until 1938, when the Soviets again bought one-quarter of Bryant's annual output. Major shipments were also made under Lend-Lease. Soviet dependence on the West for ball bearings technology peaked after the years 1959-61, when the Soviets required a capability for mass production, rather than laboratory or batch production, of miniature precision ball bearings for weapons systems. The only company in the world that could supply the required machine for a key operation in processing the races for precision bearings (the Centalign-B) was the Bryant Chucking Grinder Company. The Soviet Union had no such mass production capability. Its miniature ball bearings in 1951 were either imported or made in small lots on Italian and other imported equipment.
In 1960 there were sixty-six Centalign-B machines in the United States. Twenty-five of these machines were operated by the Miniature Precision Bearing Company, Inc., the largest manufacturer of precision ball bearings, and 85 percent of Miniature Precision's output went to military applications. In 1960 the USSR entered an order with Bryant Chucking for forty-five similar machines. Bryant consulted the Department of Commerce. When the department indicated its willingness to grant a license, Bryant accepted the order.
For the Soviets and Bryant Chucking Grinder Company the matter did not end in 1961.
In 1972, just before the presidential election, Nicholaas Leyds, general manager of the Bryant Chucking Grinder Company, announced a contract with the Soviets for 164 grinding machines. Anatoliy I. Kostousov, Minister of the Machine Tool Industry in the Soviet Union, then said they had waited twelve years for these machines, which included mostly the banned models: "We are using more and more instruments of all kinds and our needs for bearings for these instruments is very great. In all, we need to manufacture five times . more bearings than 12 years ago."
Under President Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger license for export of these 164 Centalign-B machines was approved.
Simultaneously came heavy pressure on this author to stop research work on our technological aid to the Soviet military system and to stop making public speeches on this aid.
By 1974 the Soviets had MIRVed their missiles and were in mass production. The results we well know and are reflected in the chart on page
On March 8, 1983, Secretary of Defense Weinberger not only made this massive Soviet increase public, but admitted something not admitted in the early 1970s: that the newly achieved accuracy was derived from our U.S. technology.
The Soviets at Sea
"Within weeks many of you will be looking across just hundreds of feet of water at some of the most modern technology ever invented in America. Unfortunately, it is on Soviet ships."Table 8-1
Origin of Diesel Engines of Soviet Merchant Ships
Size of Merchant
Ship (Gross
Registered Tonnage) Engines of Foreign
Design and
Construction (percent) Engines Soviet-
built under
Foreign License
(percent)
15,000 and over
10,000-14,999
5,000-9,999 100
87.9
56.9 0
12.1
43.1
*This includes diesel-electric units but not steam turbines. The chart is based on gross registered tonnage, not rated capacity of the engines, therefore it is an approximate measure only.
Illegal Actions by State Department
When we look closely at the transportation technology used to support the most dangerous international crises of the 60s, 70s and 80s, we find that the U.S. State Department not only had the knowledge and the capability to stop the technological transfers which generated the vehicles used, but was required by law to ensure that the technology was not passed to the Soviets. In other words, there would have been no Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, no supply of the Vietnamese War and no wars of liberation in Africa and Central America if State Department had followed Congressional instructions and carried out the job it is paid to do.
As Table 8-3 shows, if the State Department had done an effective job according to the laws passed by Congress, thirty-seven of the ninety-six ships would not have been in Soviet hands and would not have been able to take weapons and supplies to Haiphong.
The provision of fast, large ships for Soviet supply of the North Vietnamese indicates where export control failed.
Table 8-3
Engines of Soviet Ships on Haiphong Run and Ability of
United States to Stop Export under Battle Act and CoCom
Origin of
Diesel Engines Number
of Engines
Manufactured Could Export
Have Been
Stopped?
In USSR Outside USSR
Manufactured in USSR
to Soviet Design
Manufactured in USSR
under license and
to foreign design:
Skoda (at Russky Diesel) 5 No
Burmeister & Wain
(at Bryansk) 8 YES
Manufactured outside
USSR to foreign design: 8
Skoda (Czechoslovakia) 5 No
M.A.N. (West Germany) 11 11 Yes
Fiat S.A. (Italy) 2 2 Yes
Burmeister & Wain (in
Denmark and elsewhere
under license) 8 8 Yes
Sulzer (Switzerland) 13 No
Lang (Hungry) 4 No
Gorlitz (East Germany) 10 No
United States (Lend-Lease) 7 7₯ Yes(?)
United States (not
Lend-Lease) 1 No
Krupp (Germany) 1 1 Yes
Total: Diesel engines 13 62 37 Yes
₯Lend-Lease should be returned under the Master agreement.
Steam Turbines
and Riciprocating
Steam Engines Number
of Engines
Manufactured Could Export
Have Been
Stopped?
In USSR Outside USSR
Manufactured in USSR to
Soviet design 0
Manufactured in USSR to
foreign design 1
(possibly)
Manufactured outside
USSR:
Canada 1
United States 3
United Kingdom 1
Switzerland (Sulzer) 3
Total: Steam turbines 1 8
Grand Total: Diesel engines 75 Not identified 12
Steam turbines 9 Identified 84
84 96
Some years ago research strongly suggested that the Soviets had no indigenous military transport technology: neither motor vehicles nor marine diesel engines. Yet about 80 percent of the weapons and supplies for the North Vietnamese were transported by some means from the Soviet Union. The greater part of these Soviet weapons went to Vietnam by Soviet freighter and then along the Ho Chi Minh trail on Soviet-built trucks.
By using data of Russian origin it is possible to make an accurate analysis of the origins of this equipment. It was found that all the main diesel and steam-turbine propulsion systems of the ninety-six Soviet ships on the Haiphong supply run that could be identified (i.e., eighty-four out of the ninety-six) originated in design or construction outside the USSR. We can conclude, therefore, that if the State and Commerce Departments, in the 1950s and 1960s, had consistently enforced the legislation passed by Congress in 1949, the Soviets would not have had the ability to supply the Vietnamese War and 50,000 more Americans and countless Vietnamese would be alive today. The names of the ninety-six Soviet ships used on the Haiphong run were gleaned from Morskoi Flot and similar Russian maritime publications. The specifications of the main engines were obtained from Registrovaya Kniga Morskikh Sudov Soyuza SSR and other Russian sources. This hard information came from censored Soviet sources. The same information is only available in the West in classified government files; and it is therefore totally censored to the independent researcher and to Congress.
This is the paradox. The U.S. government is concealing, possibly unknowingly, actions which are aiding the Soviets, and which originate within U.S. government offices.
Working Both Sides of the Street
Financing of the Siberian gas pipeline is an excellent example of the two-faced nature of the deaf mute blindmen. In great part those who financed this vast expansion in Soviet ability to wage global war at Western taxpayers' expense are also prime military contractors for Western governments.
General Electric supplies guidance systems for Polaris and Poseidon missiles and jet engines for U.S. military aircraft, while at the same time supplied equipment for Soviet military end uses on credit at preferential terms that could not be obtained by an individual U.S. taxpayer. In brief, because the U.S. government guarantees these Soviet orders, General Electric is in a position to have the U.S. taxpayer subsidize its contracts in the Soviet Union while the same taxpayer is shelling out for the U.S. Defense budget.
Here are the U.S. prime contractors on "Russia No. 6," with a brief notation of their U.S. government defense contracts:
Military Contracts with United
States Government Contracts with Soviet Military
End Use (In addition to "Russia
No. 6")
General Electric Company
Total 1980 sales: $18,654 million;
military sales: $2,202 million (No.
5 in USA)
Produces jet engines for military
aircraft including F-4 Phantom,
F-5 Freedom fighter and F-18
Hornet. plant.
Guidance system for Polaris and
Poseidon missiles. General Electric Company
1981 Romania ($142 rail.)
Steam turbine generating equip-
ment for nuclear power station.
1980 USSR ($40 mil.) Sub-
contract for computers and electri-
cal equipment for electrical steel
General Electric Company
Data processing systems.
Components for nuclear weap-
pons. General Electric Company
1979 Hungary
Licensed production of poly-
propylene film, also technology
for condenser manufacture.
1979 Yugoslavia
Know-how for manufacture of
polyethylene cable.
1978 Poland ($12 rail.)
Equipment for hot strip steel mill.
1976 USSE ($90 million)
Hot gas rotating components.
Exxon Corporation
Total 1980 sales: $63,896 million
Military sales: $479 million (No.
29 in USA) Exxon Corporation
Participation, through holdings in
Ruhrgas and Gasunie, in the dis-
tribution of Soviet gas in Europe.
1978 Poland
Additives for and formulation of
high quality lubricating oils.
1977 USSR
Scientific and technical coopera-
tion, exchange of petrochemicals,
information and research cooper-
ation in developing additives to
lubricating oils, resins, solvents
and semi-finished chemical prod-
ucts over 5 years.
Royal Dutch/Shell Group
Total 1980 sale: $225,090 million
Sales to U.S. DoD were $225
million in 1980, ranking it No. 52. Royal Dutch/Shell Group
1979 Hungary
5-year cooperation in various
field including marketing.
In 1978, Shell business with
Hungary included $5 million in
buy-back products.
1979 Romania
Subsidiary General Atomic to sup-
ply Triga nuclear reactor for
research center.
1978 Bulgaria
Licensing of process for liquid
plant protectant.
1978 China
Licensing of process for $250
million methanol plant.
1976 Poland
Licensing of process for ethylene
oxide plant.
Ente Nazlonale Idrocarburi
(ENI) (U.S. Subsidiary is Agip)
Total 1980 sales: $27,186 million
Subsidiary Agip had $223 mil-
lion of business with U.S. DoD in
1989, ranking it 53rd among
U.S.defense contractors. Ente Nazlonale IdrocarburI
(ENI)
1981 GDR
5-year cooperation agreement
with Chemiaranlagen Export-Im-
port.
1981 China
Joint agreement for research and
development of Chinese petro-
chemicals and synthesized
polymers.
ENI (U.S. Subsidiary is Aglp) ENI (U.S. Subsidiary is Agip)
1981 Romania
Framework agreement for com-
plete production program of tur-
bines, compressors, pumps,
valves, etc.
1981 Hungary ($3 million)
Supply and licensing of 30,000
tpa methyl terbutyl ether (MTBE)
plant.
1980 GDR ($90 million)
Snamprogetti: construction of
highly advanced plant to recover
lead from batteries.
1979 China ($50 million)
Subsidiary Nouvo Pignone: joint
production of centrifuge com-
pressors.
1978 Hungary ($80 mil.)
Supply of gas compressor station.
1976 Poland
Subsidiary Haldor Topse: licens-
ing of process for two ammonia
plants.
1975 USSE ($200 million)
Supply of three urea plants.
Foreign Companies with Significant Department
of Defense Contracts
Rediffusion Ltd. (UK)
(Controlled by British Electric
Traction Co. Ltd.)
One of the top 10 suppliers of
electronic equipment to UK mili-
tary.
R & D work for U.S. DoD
(1977, $2.3 million); communica-
tions, data processing and flight
simulation systems. Rediffusion Ltd. (UK)
1981- USSR
Supply and videotext systems and
terminals for gas pipeline.
1979 Czechoslovakia
($1.5 million) Supply of data
transmission system and equip-
ment.
1979 Poland ($1 million)
Supply of data processing system
and computers.
1978 Czechoslovakia
($1.2 million) Supply of two com-
puter systems.
1977 USSR
Supply of computer system.
1977 Czechoslovakia
($1 million) Supply of six data en-
try systems.
1977 Poland ($1 million)
Supply of EDP computer equip-
ment.
Thomson Group
Total 1981 sales: $8,656 million
Variety of military electronics
equipment including contracts on
full range of Matra missiles such as
Crotale, Martel, Otomot, and on
MBB Kormoran antiship missiles.
Surface radars, avionics, mill-
tary data processing from Brandt
Armaments Division. Thomson Group
1979 USSR ($100 million)
Supply of computerized telephone
exchange system.
1979 USSR
Construction of printed circuit
plant at Minsk.
1979 USSR
Data processing for nuclear plants.
1976 Romania
Supply of air traffic control
system.
1978 Bulgaria
Agreement on electronics devel-
opments.
Rolls-Royce
Total 1980 sales: $2,926 million;
military sales: $250 million (No. 4
in UK)
Propulsion systems for Blood-
hound and Sea Dart missiles.
Jet and turbine engines for mili-
tary craft such as Harrier V/STOL
fighter.
With Turbomeca (France):
Adour engines for Jaguar strike
plane.
With Detroit Diesel Allison:
Spey engine for Corsair.
With Fiat and MTU: RB199
engine for Panavia Tornado. Rolls-Royce1980 USSR
Supply of "Avon" turbines for Surgut-Chelyabinsk pipeline. 1979 Romania ($450 rail.) Agreement for the supply of jet engines and eventual production. 1979 China ($220 million) License to produce supersonic Spey engines. Licensed manufacture of aircraft engines. 1974 Yugoslavia/Romania RR Viper turbojets and afterburn- ers for Yugoslav/Romanian Eagle jet fighter and Jastreb strike and
tactical reconnaissance plane.
1975 USSR
Scientific and technical coopera-
tion in industrial motors.
Fiat SpA
Total 1980 sales: $25,155 million
Subsidiary Aeritalia (50%)builds
military aircraft including F104
Starfighter. Partner in Panavia
production of Tornado strike
plane.
Subsidiary Sistemi Elettronica
(SISTEL) builds Sea Killer, Indigo,
Martel and Mariner missiles.
Fiat Aviation Divsion builds
turbine engines for military air-
craft including General Electric
licenses.
In cooperation with MTU and
Rolls-Royce: RB199 engine for
Tornado. Fiat SpA
1981 USSR ($86 million)
Fiat-Allis to supply 300 63-ton
heavy track loaders to USSR for
use in large-scale civil engineering
projects.
1981 USSR ($90 million)
Earth moving machinery for strip
mining in N. Siberia.
1980 Hungary
Subsidiary Ercole Marelli: licensing
of auto ignition tuner production.
1978- USSR ($22 million)
Subsidiary Telettra to supply tele-
communications network along
Trans-Siberian railway.
1977 Poland
Extension of licensing agreement
for auto engines and automobiles.
260,000 vehicles produced under
previous agreements.
1976 USSR
Subsidiary Comau: subcontract
for machine tools for nuclear
energy components manufactur-
ing plants (Comau sales to USSR
for period 69-74 worth $100
million).
1977 Hungary
5 year agreement for scientific and
technical cooperation.
1976 USSR
Agreement to expand auto input
and for production of manufactur-
ing, farm and building vehicles.
1976 Bulgaria
General agreement on industrial
and economic cooperation; joint
R&D.
British Petroleum Co.
Total 1980 sales: $49,471 million
1977 sales to U.S. DoD worth
$211 million. British Petroleum Co.
1981 China
Reconnaissance seismic survey in
South Yellow Sea. First by any
Western company.
1973 USSR
Technology for 75,000 tpa chlor-
oprene monomer plant in
Yerevan.
1980 USSR
Development of natural gas ex-
ploration and gas pipeline con-
struction.
1977 USSR
5-year exchange of technical in-
formation including refining
lubricants, processes, and syn-
thetic protein.
Foreign Companies with Siberian Pipeline Contracts and
Significant European Defense Contracts
Friedrich Krupp GmbH
Total 1980 sales: $7,962 million
Subsidiary of AG Weser: mili-
tary ships for West German Navy.
Subsidiary Mak Maschineenbau
GmbH: tanks for West German
Army; also development of a re-
mote controlled mine-sweeping
system.
Subsidiary Krupp Atlas Elec-
tronik: electronic equipment in-
cluding simulators and sonar
systems. Friedrich Krupp GmbH
1981-82 USSR
Supply of steel pipe.
1980 GDR ($875 million)
Construction of steel mill.
1980 Poland ($137 rail.)
Construction of coal gasification
plant.
1979 USSR ($192 million)
Construction of electric steel plant.
1977 USSE ($82 million)
Construction of DMT plant.
1977 Hungary ($7 mil.)
Vegetable oil processing plant.
1977 Czechoslovakia
Supply of effluent treatment plant;
tire-making machine.
1979 Poland
Cooperating in engineering and
plant construction, raw materials,
construction materials and foods.
1975 GDR
Long-term economic and tech-
nical cooperation deal including
3rd market sales.
Creusot-Loire
Total 1981 sales: $3,805 million
General steel products (gun
turret mountings, etc.), engines,
military vehicles. Creusot-Loire
1980 USSR ($300 million)
Prime contractor for steelcomplex
at Nololipetsk.
1979 GDR ($350 million)
Construction of nitrogen fertilizer
plant, cooperation in sales.
1978 USSR
Supply of turnkey petroleum coke
calcination unit at Krasnorodsk.
1975 USSR ($500 million)
Supply of chemical and ammonia
plants, all paid for on buy-back
basis.
1975 USSR ($37 million)
Supply of equipment for Oren-
burg natural gas complex.
1979- Bulgaria
Cooperation in mechanical en-
gineering, chemicals, power
engineering.
Aeg-Telefunken
Total 1980 sales: $6,750 million;
military sales: $755 million (No. 2
in Germany)
Guidance system on Euro-
missiles Roland, Hot and Milan.
Subcontracts for avionics and
electrical equipment on Tornado
fighter plane.
Electronic defense equipment
including radar and navigation
systems.
TR86 computer for DISTEL
command and control system
used by NATO and USAF. Aeg-Telefunken
1981 GDR ($40 million)
Subcontract to supply heavy elec-
trical equipment for plate rolling
mill at Eisenhuttenstadt.
1979 USSR ($22 million)
Telecommunications network.
1979 China ($22 million)
Electrical equipment for three
chemical plants.
1979- Romania ($1.4 rail.)
Sale of Thyristor rectifiers for
acetylene extraction.
1979- Poland
Motors for power trucks and utility
vehicles.
1977 USSR
In cooperation with Mannesmann
AG (FRG) built a section of Oren-
burg natural gas pipeline ($875
million in total).
1977 Bulgaria
Contract to plan equipment and
supervise expansion of electrical
engineering works.
1978 Yugoslavia
Joint production of copying
machines and spares.
There is a simple, direct message in the above listings. Some of the most famous multinational corporations are sufficiently amoral to accept military contracts from both sides. This is not a new story. It occurs time and again in the history of the past century, but rarely has it been possible to identify the double-dealing while in progress.
While financing highly strategic projects for the Soviets, these multinationals are selling weapons and supplies to Western governments. An obvious deduction is that these corporations have little incentive to reduce world tension. They maximize profit by keeping both sides in a state of near conflict.
The Reagan Administration Marshmallow Approach
The initial public reaction of the Reagan Administration to Russia No. 6 was realistic enough. State Department issued a two page summary listing the dangers to world
WarlordZeroOne
07-14-2009, 03:19 AM
KIWI.Mr red cent should take his Mouth for a Shit,coz He is talking out of his ARSE.
KIWI.Mr red cent should take his Mouth for a Shit,coz He is talking out of his ARSE.
:lol: ....actually that was very mild from Mr Penny WZ0, ......he had his "best-manners" bag out then !........like the rest of life mate, if anyone pisses you off, try not to let it show, nothing more annoying to a wind-up merchant than when they are ignored.
he has the right to call it as he see's it, by the amount of interest shown in the OP its not a subject that interests anyone here anyway,.........which (puff, cough-cough).....makes me ( splutter choke...cough) wonder ( pant cough cough) why I ( choke wheeze) bothered ( hack cough cough) to drag the ( splutter puff ) "smoking-canon".....( wheeze) to the top ( feeble collapse) of the farkin hill ! :smokin:
boycotteverything
07-14-2009, 10:07 PM
well i still love you, sweet lips.
well i still love you, sweet lips.
...and yet,some-how, I still dont feel complete :roll: